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COMMENT
GETTING THE LIGHTS BACK ON:
AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARYLAND ENERGY SERVICE
QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ACT'S IMP ACT ON
UTILITY LIABILITY AND CONSUMER RIGHTS

By: Elizabeth Payne*
INTRODUCTION
n the midst of one of the most ferocious winter storms in Mid-Atlantic
history, thousands of Washington D.C. area residents sat helplessly as
their homes suddenly went dark. 1 Power lines became victims of the storm,
unable to survive the barrage of rapidly falling wet snow. As households
huddled together in the dark, watching the snow and wind create white-out
conditions, many assumed the power would be back by morning.
In reality, at least four days came and went before power was finally
restored to many neighborhoods? Some families viewed the long blackout
as a minor inconvenience, utilizing fireplaces and generators, or selfevacuating to places that had electricity. For the less fortunate, the outage
resulted in long days of near-freezing temperatures in darkened apartments,
cut off from the world. These unlucky ones, often lower-income families,
had no fireplaces or generators, and could not leave until the city's public
. system reopene d .3
transportatIOn
The situation worsened as a second blizzard slammed into the area just
three days after the first storm, and before power returned to many D.C.

I

* Elizabeth Payne received her juris doctorate from the University of Baltimore
School of Law in May of2013. Elizabeth would like to personally thank her Faculty
Advisor, Professor William Hubbard of the University of Baltimore Law School, for
his advice, feedback, and patience with her comment and relentless stream of
questions.
1 See Joe Stephens, Pepco Struggles to End Power Outages, WASH. POST, Jan. 31,
2011, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/pepco-struggles-to endfower-outages/20 1110 1130/AB3RDME_story .html.
See id.
3 The blizzards resulted in shutting down all local bus routes, along with 40 aboveground Metro stations, and remained closed for days. See Carlos Hamann, Powerfol
Blizzard Shuts Down u.s. Capital, GOOGLE NEWS (Feb. 5, 2010),
http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5j3 HVBhfkkHN4c9TIIAxNk
xjbROA. Some of the above-ground stations serve some ofD.C.'s poorest
neighborhoods, including Branch Avenue, Suitland, Capitol Heights, and New
Carrollton. See WMATA, http://wmata.com/getting_around/SnowMap.pdf(last
revised May 23, 2007) (showing which stations close after eight inches of snow
accumulates).
133

134

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 43.2

neighborhoods. Many residents learned electricity would not be restored for
a week, and the Washington Post's online comment boards filled with
complaints by furious area residents. 4 The majority of the comments came
from D.C. and Maryland residents, who constituted the Potomac Electric
5
Power Company's ("PEPCO") customer base. Where is PEPCO, they
asked, and why is it taking so long? How could Virginia's power companies
seemingly restore power faster, despite having more outages?6 How were
people expected to survive in dark, cold homes, especially through another
blizzard?
While this scenario might seem extreme, anyone who weathered the 2010
"Snowmageddon" storms in southern Maryland lived through such an
ordeal. 7 Thousands in Maryland faced days without power after the
February 2010 blizzards that delivered a one-two punch and dumped over
8
two feet of snow on the D.C. area in less than a week. Then, after a series
of violent thunderstorms tore through the region in August 2010, PEPCO
customers in Montgomery and Prince George's counties lost power for
days.9 The company claimed the storms took it by surprise, but angry
residents demanded accountability.lO

See Christopher Dean Hopkins, How Have Elected Leaders Handled the Snow
Storm? Readers Respond, WASH. POST MD. POLL BLOO (Feb. 8,2010,4:23 PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.comlannapolis/20 I 0/02lhow_have_elected_leaders_han
dl.html.
5 Id.; see Stephens, supra note I; see Mary Pat Flaherty, In Storm, Pepco Last to
Seek Aid, WASH. POST, Jan. 28,2011, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.comlnational/in-storm-pepco-last-to-seekaid/2011/0Il27/ABTi4LE_story.html.
6 See Preliminary Snow Totals Ending Feb. 6,2010, NAI'L WEATHER SERV.,
http://www.erh.noaa.gov/lwx/events/?event=20100206 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
The NWS reported the following snowfall totals: 27.5 inches at American University
in D.C., 27 inches in Bethesda, Md., 25 inches in College Park, Md.; 28 inches in the
Ballston neighborhood of Arlington, Va.; and 32.4 inches at Dulles International
Airport in Loudoun County, Va. /d.
7 See Jason Samenow, Amazing Mid-Atlantic Snow Statistics, WASH. POST CAPITAL
WEATHER BLOO (Feb. 12,2010, 12:30 PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.comlcapitalweathergang/20 10/02/amazing_midatlantic_snow_stat.html. The Capital Weather Blog, a popular weather forecasting
site, created the Snowpocolypse (December 2009 blizzard), Snomaggedon (February
5-6 20 I 0 blizzard) and Snoverkill (February 9-10, 20 I 0 blizzard) nicknames, which
were then picked up by national news organizations.
8 See Flaherty, supra note 5. Over 205,000 PEPCO customers lost power by the end
of the 2010 blizzards. Virginia's Dominion Power reported 140,000 outages by the
end of the second storm, and BG&E reported 135,000. /d.
9 See Joe Stephens &.Aaron C. Davis, Pepco Defends Post-Storm Efforts at Hearing,
WASH. POST, Aug. 18,2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwpdynicontent/artic1eI201O/08/17/AR2010081705868.html; see Dan Morse, Editorial,
Pepco Acknowledges Response Problems, WASH. POST, July 28,2010, available at

4

2013]

Getting the Lights Back On

135

This scenario is not unique to the Maryland suburbs surrounding
Washington. Baltimore Gas and Electric ("BG&E") also received heavy
criticism for its storm responses, which included a week-long restoration
after 2011's Hurricane Irene. ll Nor is this problem unique to Maryland, as
Connecticut suffered from similar problems after the surprise 2011
"Snowtober" nor'easter. 12 Many customers, tired of throwing out spoiled
food, living in cold homes, or forced to move to hotels, offices, or anyplace
warm, undoubtedly wondered how such a slow response could be legal.
Does the law afford them any rights as customers? Are these companies
being held to any standard of responsibility by legislators or regulators?
After facing a massive backlash from both local media and constituents,
Maryland legislators took action.13 In early 2011, the General Assembly
passed the Maryland Electricity Service Quality and Reliability Act
("ESQR,,).14 The statute, which went into effect on July 1, 2012, required
the Maryland Public Service Commission ("PSC") create and hold Maryland
utility companies to new reliability standards. 15 Special requirements and
reports for weather-related outages may also be enacted. 16 But what will this
law actually do? Why are power companies in Maryland taking days to get
http://voices.washingtonpost.comllocal-breaking-news/maryland/pepco-outagescontinue-to-decl.html.
10 See Stephens & Davis, supra note 9. The D.C. Metro area typically has severe
and damaging thunderstorms in the late summer months. See id.
11 See Editorial, Our Say: PSC needs to look into BGE efforts following Irene, THE
CAPITAL (Annapolis, Md.), Sept. 7,2011, available at
http://capitalgazette.comlnews/our-say-psc-needs-to-look-into-bge-effortsfollowing/article_d0b4b270-fee3-56a5-b7de-3acf445259bb.html?mode=print.
12 See Dave Collins & Stephen Singer, October Snowstorm Outages Remain,
Thousands In Connecticut Enter Second Week Without Power, HUFFINGTON POST
(Nov. 7, 2011, 9:26 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2011111107/connecticutoutages-enter-second-week_ n_1079489.html. A surprise October Nor'Easter
dropped almost a foot of snow on New England, leaving approximately 830,000
Connecticut homes without power. After restoration efforts took almost two weeks,
many residents demanded government action, much like Maryland residents did after
the 2009-2010 blizzards. See id.; see Morse, supra note 9.
13 See generally MD. GEN. ASSEMB., DEP'T. OF LEGIS. SERV., Fiscal and Policy Note,
H.B. 391, 20 II Leg., 428th Sess. (Md. 2011) (hereinafter "Fiscal Policy Note").
14 MD. ELEC. SERVo QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ACT, H.B. 391, 2011 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Md. 2011) (codified as MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. § 7-213 (West 2011)); see
Bill to Penalize Utilities if They Fall Below Standards, WBAL-TV, Feb. 4,2011,
http://www.wbaltv.comlnews/26751498/detail.html (on file with author); Fiscal
Policy Note, supra note 13.
15 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13. ESQR requires that the PSC base the new
reliability and service quality standards on national ranking systems, and creates a
state goal that each electric company provide the highest levels of service quality and
reliability in a cost-effective manner. Fiscal Policy Note, sup;~·~ote i3, at 1-2"16 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2, 4.
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the lights back on? Why does it seem that Maryland's utilities move slower
than those in Virginia? Most importantly, what legal rights do citizens have,
and can they be compensated for their damages?
This comment addresses these questions and analyzes the new
requirements set forth by ESQR. Section II examines the previous statutory
and regulatory requirements Maryland imposed on electric utilities, and
explores whether the current policy of emphasizing low electricity rates is
the best way to ensure customer satisfaction and reliable service. Section III
then looks at case law to see how the courts have dealt with claims relating to
utilities. This section then examines ESQR as part of the legal framework
and addresses how the statute will correct previously identified problems.
Part IV compares Maryland's laws and regulations to Virginia's, to see if
statutory and legal differences explain the differing utility response times
after the storms. Finally, the comment concludes with considering whether
ESQR is the best method of fixing slow utility response times.
II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Regulatory Scheme
Understanding electric utility company liability issues requires a basic
knowledge of how utility regulation works. Power companies were
originally privately owned corporations regulated by the free market. 17
These companies began forming "natural monopolies" due to the costs of
providing electric power to customers. 18 A natural monopoly exists when
only one company could supply all of the demand for the area it serves. 19
Public utility companies, including electric, telephone, and water services,
· 20
are common natura1monopo 1les.
As these natural monopolies formed, self-regulation through the free
market faltered. 21 The reliabili~ and quality of electric service dropped,
causing customer dissatisfaction. 2 The government soon intervened, seeing
electric company monopolies as necessary, but also needing outside
regulation. 23 The State protected citizens by keeping costs low and requiring
utilities to advance certain legislative goals for the public's benefit. 24 In
return, states protected the utilities' profits through the creation of favorable
17 See John L. Rudy, Limitation ofLiability Clauses in Public Utility Tariffs: Is the
Rationalefor State-Sponsored Indemnity Still Valid?, 52 BUFF. L. REv. 1379, 1390

(2004).
18

See id.

Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STANFORD L. REv.
548 (1969) .
19

See id.
See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1391.
22 I d. at 1390.
23 I d. at 1391.
24 See id. at 1392.

. 20

21
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legislation. 25 State legislatures crafted regulatory systems, governed by an
oversight commission, to maintain the fragile balancing of regulatory
benefits. 26
Service agreements called "tariffs" lay at the heart of the relationship
between public utility companies and state regulatory committees?7 These
tariffs are essentially standard contracts, stating how much a power company
may charge, along with other service terms. 28 Power companies create these
tariffs, and commonly use them as a sheltering mechanism through the
inclusion of protective terms and conditions?9
One key tariff protection is the liability indemnity clause ("LIe"), which
most power companies write into its tariffs. 30 LIes block lawsuits by
stipulating when a company can be found liable for its negligence. 31
Railroad companies originally created LIes to allocate risks between the
company and its customers. 32 In 1884, the Supreme eourt upheld a railroad
company LIe, and opened the door for other utilities to adopt their use. 33
LIes are now a commonly used contractual safeguard for utility
.
34
compames.

B. A Valuation o/Goals
Regulatory systems do not simply change the state-utility relationship, but
allow states to set a utility's rates in exchange for government protection. 35
Most of the company's practices also fall under the state's power, where they
are usually regulated by an administrative agency.36 Regulatory commission
oversight ensures utility companies operate in compliance with the state's
legislative goals. 37 Such goals supposedly protect states and consumers
while guaranteeing regulated utilities do not engage in harmful or
irresponsible practices. 38
Legislatures tend to focus on three goals for energy utilities:
environmental conservation, service reliability or quality, and electricity

I d. at 1391.
26 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 13 91.
27 I d. at 1380 n.8.
28 I d. at 1380 n.8.
29 I d. at 1385.
30 I d. at 1381 n.lO; see infra at Part C for further analysis on LICs.
31 I d. at 1383-84.
32 I d. at 1382 (citing Hart v. Pa. R.R. Co., 112 U.S. 331, 343 (1884».
33 Rudy, supra note 17 at 1383-84 (citing Hart, 112 U.S. at 343).
34 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1382.
35 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1392.
36 Id. at 1391-92.
37 Id. at 1392 n.70.
38 !d. at 139l.
25
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affordability.39 Theoretically, a state could equally emphasize each of these
goals. In practice, most states pick one as the top priority and rank the other
goals accordingly.4o This necessary valuation results from the conflict each
of these goals creates with another. 41
For example, more environmentally friendly energy resources tend to cost
more, as they require updatin~ older, less "green" infrastructure, with newer,
more expensive technology. 2 In addition, few environmentally friendly
power sources can produce the same amount of voltage as a traditional
fossil-fuel power plant. 43 Nuclear power, long considered cleaner and as
productive as traditional electricity sources, remains highly controversial due
to concerns over high construction costs. 44 These economic issues make
nuclear power simply too expensive for some states in light of concerns over
nuclear fuel storage and accidents. 45
The conflict between service reliability-quality ("SRQ") and affordability
goals seems obvious at first, but these clear-cut lines vanish after examining
the real costs and benefits. 46 Many programs that raise SRQ levels require
spending money, such as tree-trimming programs and upgrading
infrastructure well before storms hit. 47 Pre-storm preparation entails hiring
sub-contractors, putting more workers on duty, and paying overtime and

I d. at 1407-08.
I d. at 1410.
41 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1408.
42 See Douglas 1. Heinold, Retail Wheeling: Is Competition Among Energy Utilities
39

40

an Environmental Disaster, or Can it be Reconciled With Integrated Resource
Planning?, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 301,313 (1996).
43 !d. at 313-14.
44 !d. at 329-30. This controversy is unlikely to end soon with the recent tragedy at
Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. See Brian Wingfield, NRC Staff to Lay
Out Next Steps on Plant Safety, Official Stays, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 12,
2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/20 12-0 1-12/nrc-staff-to-Iay-out-nextsteps-on-plant-safety-official-says.html. The Japanese tsunami and resulting nuclear
meltdown caused the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to review all Fukushima-style
reactors used in U.S. nuclear power plants. Id. Additionally, the recent Virginia
earthquake took Virginia Power's Lake Anna Nuclear Power Plant offline after
concerns over damage arose. Press Release, Dominion Virginia Power Begins
Restart of North Anna Power Station, DOMINION POWER, Nov. 11,2011,
http://dom.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=1053. In light of these recent
events, many Americans were reminded of the dangers of nuclear power. See
Christopher Joyce, After Fukushima: A Changing Climate for Nuclear, NPR (Dec.
24,2011,5:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011l12/241144194064/after-fukushima-achanging-climate-for-nuclear.
45 See Heinold, supra note 42, at 308-09.
46 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1415; see Steven Ferrey, Reliability and Blackouts, 1
1. INDEP. POWER § 10:3.1, 10-30.2-3 (2011).
47 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1415; see Ferrey, supra note 46, at 10-34.
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other costs so that ample response teams are available to repair damaged or
downed wires. 48
On the other hand, power companies that do not practice regular treetrimming and upgrading have higher chances of suffering from outages. 49
Storms regularly knock overhanging limbs onto wires or inflict water
damage on unprotected or worn equipment. 50 This reality highlights a
logical flaw in electric companies' favorite argument against higher SRQ
goals? Massive service restoration projects after storms sometimes cost
consumers as much, if not more, than SRQ optimization programs. 52
Despite SRQ programs potentially lowering utility expenses in the long
run, many states prioritize affordability above SRQ goals. 53 Electricity is a
basic need. 54 State governments thus set goals to maximize affordability.55
Keeping costs low validates regulatory programs and agreements, along with
any protections for utilities therein. 56 Utility companies argue that making
affordability the primary goal protects the most vulnerable consumers while
allowing for greater economic growth overall. 57 Proponents claim lower
rates attract new business owners, industry, and may even bring in new
residents. 58
However, high SRQ levels also lure new businesses and homeowners. 59
For example, some businesses may choose their location based on a need to
minimize power outages that damage sensitive equipment. 60 Many
technological industries require constant electric service, and outages take
entire servers hosting cloud technology for international clients offline. 61
Widespread power outages cost millions, even when they affect a small
See Ferrey, supra note 46, at 10-30.5-6.
See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1411.
50 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 5.
51 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1415.
52 Id.
53 See generally Ferrey, supra note 46; see also Rudy, supra note 17, at 1398; see
also Heinold, supra note 42, at 303; see also Liability of Elec. Power Companies for
Injury or Damages Resulting from Problems in the Delivery of Electric Power, 82
Md. P.S.C. 92,101 (1991) (hereinafter "In re Singer").
54 See Ferrey, supra note 46, at 10-30.3.
55 See generally Ferrey, supra note 46.
56 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1398.
57 !d.
58 !d.
59 See generally Singer Co., Link Simulation Sys. Div. v. Bait. Gas & Elec. Co., 79
Md. App. 461,468,558 A2d 419, 422 (1989); see generally Ferrey, supra note 46.
60 See generally Singer, 79 Md. App. at 468, 558 A.2d at 422.
61 See id. For an example of the widespread effects ofa cloud server outage, see
Sharon Gaudin, Amazon Cloud Outage Staggers Into Day 2, COMPUTERWORLD
(Apr. 22, 2011, 12:01 PM),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9216083/Amazon_cloud_outage_staggers_
into_Day_2_ (discussing the Amazon Cloud Services outage in 2011).
48
49
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62
area. California's scheduled rolling blackouts cost the Silicon Valley area
$75 million a day.63 The August 2003 blackout resulted in $1 billion in
losses for New York City's businesses. 64 In today's globalized,
technologically-dependent world, power outages are serious business. 65

C. Liability Indemnity Clauses and Service Quality Issues
Electric company LICs focus on service interruptions reSUlting in a loss of
power, especially due to "acts of God," because the nature of electric power
puts the delivery method of exposed wires at the whim of the weather. 66
Power lines hang, dangerously exposed to winds, tree branches, and snow. 67
Even underground wiring is vulnerable to flooding. 68 Power companies,
unable to control the weather, rightly fear being held liable for outages
outside of their control. 69
There are reasonable actions power companies can take to pregare for
major storms, and most power companies prepare well in advance. Many
power companies routinely trim tree branches away from wires. 71 Most
power companies prepare for expected weather events through extensive
72
planning, including calling in extra help ahead of the storm. But regulated
companies find themselves stuck between the proverbial rock and hard
place. 73 Storm-preparation programs cost money, but state-set electricity
rates block utility companies from raising their rates to pay for such
programs. 74 Hence, electric companies insert strict LICs into their tariffs,
with the state's approval so long as affordability is maximized. 75
See Ferrey, supra note 46, at lO-30.3.
See Ferrey, supra note 46, at 10-30.6.
64 See Ferrey, supra note 46, at 10-30.5.
6S See Ferrey, supra note 46, at 10-30.5, 10-30.6, 10-33.
66 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1385. LIes often mirror force majeure clauses in
traditional contracts. Id. For an analysis offorce majeure clauses in utility
contracts, see Jennifer Sniffen, In the Wake of the Storm: Nonperformance of
Contract Obligations Resultingfrom a Natural Disaster, 31 NOVA L. REv. 551,573
F00 7).
7 See generally Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13; see Stephens, supra note I.
68 See generally Overhead and Underground Electrical Service FAQs, FLA. POWER
& LIGHT, http://www.fpl.comlfaqs/underground.shtml. (last visited Feb. 28, 20l3).
69 See Ferrey, supra note 46; see Rudy, supra note 17, at 1393-94.
70 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1415. Regulatory commissions require utility
companies make reasonable preparations when weather forecasts show incoming
storms that may cause outages. For examples oflocal power company storm
preparation, see Kate Ryan, Area Power Companies Prep for Irene, wrop (Aug.
27,2011,9:03 AM), http://www.wtop.coml?nid=41&sid=25l3520.
71 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1414-16.
72 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2-3.
73 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1410.
74 !d. at 1413.
75Id.
62
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D. LIes and Affordability Goals in Maryland
In Maryland, the Public Service Commission (PSC) oversees state
regulation of all utilities. 76 Many Maryland power companies, including
PEPCO and BG&E, fall under the PSC's oversight. 77 Maryland is not,
however, a purely regulatory scheme. 78 Maryland recently adopted a
competitive cooperative market system ("co-op"), meaning some utilities
still fall under state regulation, but other utilities offer electricity service at
competitive market rates. 79 These unregulated co-op merchants often offer
environmentally-friendly power sources, for a price. 8o While the consumer
buys the power directly from the co-op company, the regulated utility
company still provides the equipment actually transferring electric power
(Le., the power lines and transformers).81 The co-op company pays a usage
82
fee to the regulated company, taken out of the customer's payment. This
creates two kinds of markets at work in Maryland, one subject to regulation,
another impacted by it. 83
III. THE JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY POWER STRUGGLE OVER
UTILITY NEGLIGENCE LIABILITY
A. Gross Negligence and Utility Liability in Maryland
In Maryland, utility providers' tariff LICs may contract away all liability ,
with the exception of "gross negligence.,,84 Gross negligence is an oft-used
legal term, but subject to a variety of interpretations. 85 The standard's
gravity allows it to sometimes overcome contributory negligence, which bars

MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. Cos. § 2-112, 113 (West 2011); 9 M.L.E. Elee. Co. §
3, Electric Companies.
77 See 9 M.L.E. Elee. Co. § 3, Electric Companies.
78 See 9 M.L.E. Elec. Co. § 3, supra note 78.
79 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. Cos. § 7-504 (West 2011); see Rudy, supra note
17, at 1381, 1408.
80 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. Cos. § 7-504; see Rep. Jim Cooper, Policy Essay,
Electric Co-Operatives: From New Deal to Bad Dean, 45 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 335,
337 (2008).
81 See Cooper, supra note 81, at 336.
82 See Choosing Your Residential Electricity Supplier, MD. ATT'y. GENERAL,
http://www.oag.state.md.us/energy/ (last visited on Jan. 13,2012).
83 See 9 M.L.E. Elee. Co. § 3, supra note 78.
84 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 479, 558 A.2d at 427; see Randolph Stuart Sergent,
Gross, Reckless, Wanton, and Indifferent: Gross Negligence in Maryland Civil Law,
30 U. BALT. L. REv. 1,42 (2000).
85 See Sergent, supra note 85, at 2.
76
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liability claims in Maryland. 86 However, the standard also makes a
successful lawsuit against an electric company highly unlikely, and previous
PSC actions ensured LlCs will protect utilities from all but the most
.
I'
87
egregIOus
calms.
Gross negligence, under Maryland law, requires severe recklessness and
actual knowledge of the potential risks by the acting party.88 Maryland
courts require showing substantial risk of foreseeable and almost certain
harm to another's person or property.89 The actor must also have a "manifest
duty" to the endangered party.90 In the electric utility context, this duty
springs from the contractual relationship between companies and their
customers. 91
The analysis does not stop after determining reasonable foreseeability and
potential harm.92 Maryland courts also look at underlying social policies in
determining gross negligence. 93 Here, power companies protect themselves
through the PSC and their tariffs. 94 Maryland's regulatory scheme strives to
achieve affordable electricity access for as many people as possible. 95 The
PSC places far less emphasis on quality and reliability standards because
efforts to achieve these goals can limit access and raise costs. 96 Similarly,
liability for outage damages will raise electricity costs, especially after major
storms. 97 Maryland electric companies commonly argue this point when
faced with a suit, and win. 98 The PSC's social policies effectively shield

See Minor v. State, 326 Md. 436, 441, 605 A.2d 138, 140 (1992); see Singer, 79
Md. App. at 480, 558 A.2d at 428. The electric utility standard is indistinguishable
from the "willful and wanton" standard for trespassers under Maryland law, a
common area of electric utility liability claims. Sergent, supra note 85, at 2. The
contributory negligence doctrine creates an affirmative defense to a negligence claim
by showing the plaintiff's aggrieved or partially caused their injury. See Sergent,
supra note 85, at 2.
87 See Minor, 326 Md. at 441, 605 A.2d at 140; see also Singer, 79 Md. App. at 480,
558 A.2d at 428; see also In re Singer, supra note 53, at 92.
88 See Minor, 326 Md. at 441, 605 A.2d at 140; see also Sergent, supra note 85, at
56-58.
89 See Minor, 326 Md. at 441,605 A.2d at 140; see Sergent, supra note 85, at 58-59.
90 See Sergent, supra note 85, at 42.
91 I d. at 41-42 (citing Marriott Corp. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 124 Md.
App. 463,467-68, 723 A.2d 454,457 (1998)).
92 See Sergent, supra note 85, at 58-59.
93 I d. at 64-65.
94 I d. at 41-42.
95 Singer, 79 Md. App. at 479,558 A.2d at 427.
96 I d.
97 See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1393-94.
98 See, e.g., Premier Parks, Inc. v. BaIt. Gas & Elec. Co., 37 F. Supp. 2d 732, 735 (D.
Md. 1999); Singer, 79 Md. App. at 477-78,558 A.2d at 427.
86
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utility companies from liability.99 This creates little incentive for utility
companies to pursue adequate storm response programs or SRQ initiatives.
B. Singer and the PSC: Who has the Final Say?

Only one Maryland case shows the state courts attempting to carve out a
limited area of legal sanctuary for customers hurt by a utility's negligence.
In Singer v. BG&E, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland limited the
amount of liability an LIC could block.lOO The case centered on frequent
power outages caused by lightning-damaged electrical equipment owned by
BG&E. 101 The outages affected Singer's industrial machinery that needed a
constant electric supply, and so Singer informed BG&E of the outages. \02
BG&E knew a damaged ~ower station caused the outages, but failed to take
any action to repair it. I 3 Singer sued, alleging breach of contract and
·
104
neg 1Igence.
Singer brought multiple issues to the court's attention, the first being
whether the Maryland VCC's implied warranty for goods applied to
electricity. 105 The Court, following other jurisdictions, ruled electricity only
becomes a good under the VCC when it reaches the meters on a house
because it is not converted for household use until that point. 106 While this
limited any breach of contract claims, the Singer court nevertheless held that
BG&E may be liable for the outages. I07 BG&E's tariffLIC limited BG&E's
liability to "willful default or neglect on its part," and excluded liability for
weather-caused interruptions or anything "beyond its control."I08 BG&E
argued for a narrow interpretation, stating that it should only be found liable
when plaintiffs could prove that BG&E acted with actual malice. 109

99 See, e.g., Premier Parks, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 735; Singer, 79 Md. App. at 480,558
A.2d at 428.
100 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 480, 558 A2d at 428.
101Id. at 468-69, 558 A.2d at 422-23.
102 !d.
103 !d. at 469, 558 A.2d at 423.
104 I d. at 465,558 A2d at 421.
105Id. The UCC implied warranty rule applies guaranteed warranties of fitness and
merchantability to all goods, which some states interpret to include electricity. See
generally, Gary D. Spivey, Annotation, Electricity, Gas or Water Furnished by
Public Utility as "Goods" Within Provisions of Uniform Commercial Code, Article
2 On Sales, 48 AL.R. 3d 1060. For the Maryland DCC's implied warranty
provisions, see MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 2-314, 2-315 (West 2011).
106 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 471-72, 558 A2d at 424.
107Id. at 480, 558 A2d at 428. Singer appealed from a summary judgment decision
in the circuit court, which the Court of Special Appeals returned the case for a final
decision. Id.
108 See id. at 477,558 A.2d at 427.
109 See id. at 477,558 A2d at 426.
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However, the court interpreted the LIC clause as requiring "willful default"
or "willful neglect" by consciously failing to fulfill a duty to a customer. 1I0
Singer's holding thus broadened the legal responsibilities of Maryland power
companies.1I1
BG&E based its argument of allowing utility liability only for malicious
conduct on the policy goals of the Maryland PSC. ll2 The company claimed
any broader liability would result in electricity rates rising, undermining the
State's goal of maximum affordability.1l3 Furthermore, BG&E admitted that
outages and interruptions were part of the electricity business and
unavoidable. 1I4 BG&E could not stop weather from damaging electricity
delivery systems, it argued, and their tariffs, approved by the PSC, accounted
for storm related damages by barring this area of liability. liS
The Court of Special Appeals disagreed. 116 Singer suggested that
weather-related damages to power systems might fall under a company's
control if the company failed to fix the problems.117 At that point, a utility
engaged in willful neglect of its duty to customers and thus became liable. 118
Had Singer remained controlling law, the Maryland General Assembly
may not have needed to later create the ESQR. 119 Perhaps because Singer
left utility companies like BG&E and PEP CO unhappy, the PSC reviewed
the case and the limitations on LICs in general. 120 The subsequent PSC
opinion slammed the door shut on any broader interpretation of utility
liability. 121
The PSC invoked its regulatory authority to address whether there should
be a uniform standard of liability, and whether utilities should be able to

II0Id. at 480, 558 A.2d at 428.
See generally id. at 480, 558 A.2d at 427; see In re Singer, supra note 53, at 93.
112 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 478-79,558 A.2d at 427.
113 See id. at 479, 558 A.2d at 427.
114 See id. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals agreed that weather-related
outages and interruptions could not be totally avoided and initially fell outside a
power company's control. !d.
15 See id.
116 See id. at 428, 558 A.2d at 428.
117 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 480, 558 A.2d at 428. The Maryland Court of Special
Appeals remanded the case, declining to make such a decision themselves. Id.
II See id. As previously mentioned, Singer dealt with the after-effects of weatherrelated damages, and not an actual case involving a weather-caused outage. Id.
However, Singer certainly suggested that at some point, a utility company's duty to
mitigate outages arises, even when weather is the cause. !d.
119 See generally In re Singer, supra note 53; see Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13.
120 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 101. The PSC never stated this was their real
reason, but one could imagine the PSC found themselves under considerable
pressure from utility companies to assert their jurisdiction and limit Singer's
applicability.
It I Id. at 101.
III
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limit potential liability. 122 All of the Maryland utilities submitted comments
to the PSC on these issues, with BG&E and PEPCO vehemently fighting
against any LIC limitations. 123 PEPCO even submitted a proposed change to
their LIC tariff, allowing liability only for "intentional misconduct," a higher
level than the Singer court's interpretation of gross negligence. 124
The utilities' efforts paid off, and the PSC ruled any LICs were valid as
long as they were "reasonable," declining to create any uniform standard. 12S
The PSC decision deferred limiting the scope of reasonableness to the
utilities themselves. 126 Instead, the PSC found each company's unique
operations required each LIC to be tailored to the company's needs. 127 The
decision found that utility companies were best suited to interpret what their
LICs meant, making Singer's judicial interpretations irrelevant due to the
PSC's authority. 128
While the PSC did not directly overturn Singer, its ruling demonstrates
that the PSC believes Maryland's affordability goal substantially outweighs
any SRQ initiatives. 129 Singer would give utility companies a reason, albeit
small, to upgrade systems and implement procedures to maximize SRQ
ratings in order to escape any liability.l30 However, the PSC's decision
indicates that even the most protective LICs would be upheld, and SRQ
standards would not be a major concern as long power companies minimized
their rates. 131 Even more concerning was that the PSC essentially gave
power companies full power to interpret what constitutes a "reasonable" LIC,
and where this boundary falls. l32 The PSC asserted that "gross negligence"
would not be covered by an LIC, but strongly suggested that the Singer
decision did not find such level of negligence. 133 Thus, gross negligence for

122 !d. at 93. The PSC's regulatory authority allows the Commission to review utility
actions and issue regulatory orders. See id.; see generally MD. CODE REGS.
20.50.07.05 (2011).
123 In re Singer, supra note 53, at 93-94.
124Id. at 104. Under the ruling, PEPCO would be allowed to adopt such language in
its LIC, as long as it was reasonable. !d. at 105. However, PEPCO withdrew the
request before the PSC made its decision. Id.
125 See id. at 105.
126 See id. at 101.
127 See id. Such factors requiring this approach included the different jurisdictions
and needs of each company; the range in service areas and demands; and the fact that
some companies served mUltiple jurisdictions that fell outside the state. Id. PEPCO
is a Maryland utility that also serves Washington, D.C.
128 See id. at 101-02.
129 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 104, 105.
130 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 469, 478, 558 A.2d at 423, 428.
\31 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 101.
132 See id. at 105.
133 See id. at 104; see Singer, 79 Md. App. at 480,558 A.2d at 428.
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utilities is a higher standard than the term's traditional meaning, and has been
interpreted to mean "intentionally.,,134
The decision also allowed PEPCO to create an incredibly rsrotective LIC,
one that allowed damages only for "intentional misconduct.,,1 5 This PEPCa
standard obscures the line between what is and is not reasonable. 136 Giving
the utilities full interpretative power severely limited Maryland courts' role
in any utility negligence claims, offering little legal recourse for damaged
Maryland consumers.
C. Gross Liability After In re Singer
Two recent cases highlight how the PSC's order limits the judiciary's role
in current utility damage claims. 137 The first case, Maryland Jockey Club of
Baltimore City v. BG&E ("Jockey Club"), found that the PSC essentially
declared Singer no longer good law. 138 Jockey Club ruled that the PSC
required finding the electric company acted with "intentional" negligence,
and that the PSC's ruling bound the court.139 Jockey Club applied this
interpretation to the same BG&E tariff interpreted in Singer, highlighting the
judiciary's deference to the PSC. 140 Jockey Club found that under the tariff
and the PSC's public policy considerations, the "gross negligence" turned on
whether the utility actually intended to cause harm by failing to act
correctly. 141 Even though Jockey Club is unreported, it highlights how
hesitant courts are to find gross negligence after the PSC's ruling, all but
closing the door to any realistic legal relief for injured Maryland
consumers. 142
A 1999 decision, Premier Parks, Inc. v. BG&E ("Premier Parks"), comes
from Maryland's federal district court, and deals with the same BG&E tariff

134 See Md. Jockey Club ofBalt. City, Inc. v--Balt. Gas & Elec. Co., 2002 WL
32123994, at *3-5 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2002) (unreported case); see Premier Parks,
Inc., 37 F. Supp. 2d 732 at 735-37.
135 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 104-05.
136 See id.
137 See Jockey Club, 2002 WL 32123994 at *3-5; see Premier Parks, 37 F. Supp. 2d
at 735. The fact that these two cases and Singer make up the Maryland case law
handling power company liability for outages shows how few cases even make it to
court.
138 See Jockey Club, 2002 WL 32123994 at *5. Jockey Club is an unreported 2002
case from the Maryland Court of Special Appeals. While the case is merely
persuasive authority, it best shows the high standard set for utility negligence cases
after the PSC invalidated Singer.
139 See id.
140 See id. at *3.
141 See id. at * 1O.
142 See id. at *10; see In re Singer, supra note 53, at 92.
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LIC addressed in Singer. 143 The plaintiff alleged the LIC's language should
be treated as ambiguous and given to a fact-finder. l44 However, Premier
Parks relies on both Singer and the PSC's ruling to find that Singer settled
the meaning of the LIC. 145 The Court did not find the PSC overruled or
invalidated Singer, showing that conflicting judicial interpretations over
Singer's applicability remained. l46 Nevertheless, Premier Parks failed to
clearly define when a utility acts with "gross negligence.,,147
IV. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ESQR: STRICT NEW POLICY OR
F ATALL Y FLAWED LEGISLA nON?

A. Pre-ESQR Maryland Statutes
Interruption

Regarding

Utility

Service

The previously addressed Maryland court cases did not involve weatherrelated outages, and therefore did not explain what actions a utility would be
required to take under those circumstances. 148 There is a simple explanation
for this: some utilities' LICs explicitly bar any actions for weather-related
outages. 149 Coupled with this is the fact that weather events are unlikely to
involve "§ross negligence," because power companies cannot control the
weather. 15 However, Maryland statutes and regulations do require certain
procedures and standards for responding to weather-related outages. 151 The
question is whether these regulations are enough to combat unnecessarily
long outages, or if they could possibly provide a baseline for gross
negligence cases?
The Code of Maryland Regulations ("CO MAR") requires electric utilities
suffering from storm-caused outages to restore power as quickly as the
·r

See Premier Parks, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 734-35; see Jockey Club, 2002 WL
32123994 at *3; cf Singer, 79 Md. App. at 477,558 A.2d at 427.
144 See Premier Parks, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 735.
.
145 See id. at 735-36 (citing Singer, 79. Md. App. at 477,480,558 A.2d at 427).
146 See Premier Parks, 37 F. Supp. 2d at 736. It should also be noted that neither of
these two cases dealt with weather-related outages.
147 See id. at 737. The court spent little time addressing what gross negligence would
actually be, or what facts would be required, and instead states that only ordinary
negligence took place.
148 See Jockey Club, 2002 WL 32123994, at *9; see Premier Parks, 37 F. Supp. 2d at
737; see Singer, 79 Md. App. at 480,558 A.2d at 428.
149 See Singer, 79 Md. App. at 477,558 A.2d at 427 (quoting § 2.5 ofBG&E's
Electrical Service Tariff).
ISO See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1395; see In re Singer, supra note 53, at 102; see
Jockey Club, 2002 WL 32123994, at *5.
lSI See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. Cos. § 5-303 (West 2011); see MD. CODE REGS.
20.50.12.13 (2012); see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.07 (2011); see MD. CODE REGS.
20.50.12.06 (2012); see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.03B (2011).
143
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circumstances reasonably allow. 152 Companies also must file a report with
the PSC at the start of a "major outage event," detailing the number of
affected customers and an estimated restoration time. 153 All utilities must
file a post-major storm report within three weeks of a storm's end,
documenting how many outages occurred and what preparations were
154
After such an event, the PSC may review the utilities' responses
taken.
and make recommendations, either on their own accord or in response to
consumer complaints. ISS
The problem with these regulations springs from their lack of clear
definitions and varying levels of utility compliance. 156 For example,
COMAR defines what constitutes a "major storm" as a weather-related event
resulting in service interruptions to either ten percent or one hundred
thousand of a utility's customers for more than twenty-four hours. 157 Power
companies should be able to determine when this threshold has been met on
their own; but PEPCO and BG&E failed to file such reports before or after
the 2010 blizzards that left 236,000 BG&E customers and over 300,000
PEPCO customers without power for multiple days. 158
Additionally, the reporting requirement for companies to submit response
plans "at the onset of a storm," lacks clarity and efficiency. 159 COMAR does
MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05A (2011).
See id. at 20.50.07.05B(1)(A).
154 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.12.13 (2012).
155 The 2010 snowstorm response shows a PSC review due to customer complaints.
See In the Matter of an Investigation Into the Reliability and Quality of the Elec.
Dist. Servo of Potomac Elec. Power Co., Md. P.S.c. Order 83552, at 443 (Aug. 26,
2010) (hereinafter "PEPCO Snow Response Order"). For an example of a poststorm PSC Review that is not in response to complaints, see generally In reo Elec.
Servo Interruptions Due to Hurricane/Tropical Storm Isabel and the Thunderstorms
of Aug. 26-28, 2003, 95 Md. P.S.c. 62 (2004) (hereinafter In re Isabel).
156 See PEPCO Snow Response Order, supra note 156 (highlighting PEPCO's
delayed compliance in responding to previous PSC orders).
157 MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.03B (2011); see In the Matter of an Investigation Into
the Performance of Uti Is. During the Snow Storms Between the Period Feb. 5
Through Feb. 12,2010, Md. P.S.C. Order 83173 (Feb. 25,2010) (hereinafter "Snow
Storm Report Order").
158 See Snow Storm Report Order, supra note 158, at 1; see Joe Stephens and Aaron
M. Davis, Pepco Defends Post-Storm Efforts at Hearings, WASH. POST, Aug. 18,
2010, at 2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwpdynicontentiarticle/2010108/17/AR2010081705868.html; see Joe Stephens, Pepco
Struggles to End Power Outages, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2011, at 1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.comllocaUpepco-struggles- to~end-power
outages/2011101l30/AB3RDME_story.html. COMAR requires electric companies
to maintain service interruption records that include the amount and duration of the
outages, which should allow utilities to easily determine when the definition of a
"major storm" is met. See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05D (2011).
159 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05B(a)(1)(2012). None of the PSC orders or
reviews mentions if any Maryland utilities filed "onset" reports, or when such a
152

153
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not require these "onset" reports to detail what preparations the utility made,
or if the filing mandate arises only when pre-existing outages are present. 160
The regulations do not require specific preparations for storms. 161
Companies may be fined and ordered to make changes by the PSC, but these
rare sanctions come long after the outages take place. 162 It doesn't appear
that COMAR offers any potential legal or regulatory relief for beleaguered
customers. 163 The regulations also fail to provide strong deterrents for slow
restoration and ill-prepared companies, even though the state protects these
utilities from traditional disincentives. l64 The question remains: how is the
current regulatory system benefitting Maryland residents from utility abuses?
B. Setting the Stage for Consumer Outrage
One key reason for a lack of Maryland legislative action regarding
electric service reliability could be that there was insignificant consumer
demand for such changes before 2009. 165 The PSC noted utilities responded
well to the outages caused by 2003 's Hurricane Isabel, improving upon past

report would be mandated. See In re Isabel, supra note 156, at 62; see Snow Storm
Report Order, supra note 158 at 1-2; see PEPCO Snow Response Order, supra note
156, at 1.
160 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05B (2012).
161 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05 (2012).
162 See Joe Stephens, Maryland Public Service Commission fines Pepco $1 million,
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2011, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.comllocallmaryland-pub lic-service-commission -finespepco-1-million/20 11112/21/gIQAwRiz90_ story.html; see, e.g., In re Isabel, supra
note 156, at 62. The Isabel review came almost one year after Hurricane Isabel
struck Maryland. See id. The P.S.C. did not make a final decision or levy fines on
PEPCO for the outages during the February, 2010 Blizzards until December, 2011.
See In re Isabel, supra note 156, at 62. Additionally, PSC decisions rarely levy such
fines and tend to focus on recommendations instead of mandatory actions that will
improve response time. See In re Isabel, supra note 156, at 62, 66.
163 MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05 (2011); MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.12.13 (2012); MD.
CODE REGS. 20.50.12.06 (2012); MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.03B (2011).
164 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05 (2011); see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.12.06
(2012); see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.12.13 (2012); see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.03B
(2011). Such protections are thought to be the basic reasoning behind allowing such
natural monopolies to take place. See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1390-91. More
traditional protections from utility negligence would be legal action and market
choice for consumers. See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1391, 1393. Cooperatives do not
truly offer "market choice," as part of the customers' rates goes to paying the "host"
utility. See Rudy, supra note 17, at 1408.
165 None of the reports found demonstrated any such demands from Maryland
residents, or indicated a large number of complaints to the PSC or State Legislators.
See In re Isabel, supra note 156, at 66.
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166
2003-2009 brought a relatively calm period of weather. 167
performances.
However, the 2009-2010 winter forced Maryland consumers to re-evaluate
their viewpoints on whether the current system really worked. 168
The first blizzard, nicknamed the "Snowpocolypse," dumped a record
fifteen inches of snow on the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area days
before the Christmas holiday.169 The fast-falling, thick, wet snow came with
plenty of warning: local meteorologists warned of a major winter weather
event seventy-two hours prior to the storm's onset. l7O The wet snow caused
power outages across the region, mostly from trees falling onto electric
wires, and paralyzed the region days before the Christmas holiday.171 While
the outages did not reach significant levels, many transportation offices and
Virginia's Dominion Power Company took the storm as an opportunity to
review their internal blizzard response plans. 172
Unfortunately, the December 2009 storm was winter's warm-up act for a
Mid-Atlantic assault. 173 In early February, meteorologists began forecasting

166 See In re Isabel, supra note 156, at 3 (noting improved responses in comparison
to utility restoration stemming 1997's Hurricane Floyd).
167 Jason Samenow, Amazing Mid-Atlantic Snow Statistics, WASH. POST: CAPITAL
WEATHER GANG BLOG (Feb. 12,2010,12:30 PM),
voices. washingtonpost.comlcapitalweathergang/20 10102/amazing_midatlantic_snow_stat.html (showing no major winter storms between 2003-2009).
168 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 4.
169 Va. Div. of Energy Reg. Spec. Rep., Preparation for and Response to the
December 2009 Snowstorm, VA. STATE CORP. COMM'N, at 3-4 (Aug. 2010). The
blizzard was actually a Nor'easter, a common weather phenomenon in the MidAtlantic with forty mph winds during the storm, and caused the D.C. Metro subway
system to close all aboveground stations. The blizzard also shut down the Federal
Government. Ashley Halsey III, Sandya Somashekar, Josh White, Washington's Big
Dig, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2009), available at ttp:llwww.washingtonpost.comlwpdynicontentiarticle12009112/20/AR2009122001153.html. The Snowpocolypse
caused Maryland, Virginia, and D.C. to declare states of emergency. Va. Div. of
Energy Reg. Spec. Rep., at 4.
170 See Tim Ballisty, Snow Totals Adding Upfrom Blizzard 2009, The Weather
Channel.com (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.weather.comloutlooklweathernews/news/articles/winter-storm-aiming-for-mid-atlantic_ 2009-12-17.
171 See Va. Div. of Energy Reg. Spec. Rep., supra note 170, at 1.
172 See generally Va. Div. of Energy Reg. Spec. Rep., supra note 170 (providing
overall analysis of Virginia power company's response to storm). The storm caused
approximately 1.5 million power outages on the East Coast. Va. Div. of Energy
Reg. Spec. Reg., supra note 170, at 4-5. Virginia's Dominion Power had over 1,500
outages in Northern Virginia. CBS News: Major Storm Bears Down on MidAtlantic, CBS NEWS (Dec. 20, 2009, 7:50 AM),
http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2009/ 121 18/nationallmain5996542. shtml.
Maryland companies did not submit a major outage event report for this storm, and
no figures were available.
173 See Jason Samenow, Forecast: Major Snowstorm poised to strike, WASH. POST
(Feb. 4, 201010:40 AM),
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for another major blizzard ("the 2010 Snowmaggedon Blizzard,,).174 Two
days before this second blizzard hit, weather reports alarmingly predicted
that a third blizzard would come just days after the second one, resulting in
175
Residents
approximately three feet of snow falling on the D.C. area.
flocked to the stores to stock up, the Federal government shut down, and the
region readied itself for this historic snow event. 176
Most area utilities also prepared for the storm, knowing widespread
outages would occur.177 Virginia's Dominion Power moved internal crews
up to Northern Virginia the day before the storm, and called in an additional
200 outside subcontractors. 178 BG&E requested 400 extra crewmembers the
day of the storm. 179 PEPCO did not make any requests until a second BG&E
call went out after the storm began. ISO As a result, PEPCO mounted a
severely crippled response, especially in comparison to Dominion and
BG&E. 181 Dominion and BG&E's service areas are not only larger than
PEPCO's, but also include more rural and isolated areas. I82 Some angry
PEPCO customers found themselves waiting in the cold for over a week. 183
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/capitalweathergang/20 10/02/forecast_another_maj
or weekend.html.
174Deborah Tedford, East Coast Digs Out From Record Snow, NPR, (Feb. 10,2010
5:05 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=123558638.
175 See Jason Samenow, Remembering 2010 's Snoverkill, WASH. POST CAPITAL
WEATHER GANG BLOG, (Feb. 9, 2011,11:45 AM), http://
voices. washingtonpost.com/capi talweathergang/20 11 /02/remem bering_snoverkill.ht
ml. The third and final blizzard, nicknamed "Snoverkill", resulted in whiteout
conditions and an additional twenty inches of snow falling in twelve hours. Id.
176 See Carol Morello & Ashley Halsey, III, Historic Snowstorm in D.C. Leaves a
Mess to be Reckoned with, WASH. POST, (Feb. 7, 20 I 0), available at
http://www .washingtonposLcom/wpdynlcontentlarticle/20 I 0/02/06/AR20 10020600683.html.
177 Mary Pat Flaherty, In Storm, Pepco Last to Seek Aid, WASH. POST, (Jan. 28,
2011), available at http://www.washingtonposLcom/national/in-storm-pepeco-lastto-seek-aidl2011/01l27/ABTi4LE_story.html.
178 See Flaherty, supra note 178.
179 See Flaherty, supra note 178.
180 See Flaherty, supra note 178.
181 See Flaherty, supra note 178.
182 See PEPCO.COM, New Construction: Service Map, PEPCO.COM,
http://www.pepco.com/business/services/new/map/ (last accessed Jan. 15,2012)
(showing that PEPCO serves D.C. and Maryland's Montgomery and Prince
George's Counties); see Virginia Energy Patterns and Trends, VIRGINIA TECH,
http://www.energy.vt.eduiveptielectric/serviceareas.asp (last accessed Jan. 14,2011)
(showing that Dominion Power, a.k.a. Virginia Power, serves Arlington, Fairfax,
Prince William, Stafford, and Fauquier Counties, and the Cities of Alexandria, Falls
Church, Fairfax, and Fredericksburg).
183 See Andrew Gully, Blizzards Shut Down Washington, Boston and New York on
the United States Eastern Seaboard, THE HERALD SUN (Feb. 11,2010 8:23 AM),
http://www.heraldsun.com.aulnews/victorialblizzards-shut-down-washington-
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Families found themselves forced to evacuate their homes due to freezing
l84
temperatures.
A Washington Post investigation reported PEPCO's failure
to prepare for the storms, resulting in an outpouring of criticism from furious
PEPCO customers. 185 PEPCO not being held responsible for its lackluster
preparation was a common theme of consumer outrage. 186 The Post's
investigation also revealed that the PSC previously failed to act on PEPCO's
already poor ranking for service reliability.187 Maryland residents found
themselves unable to trust the PSC, and demanded legislative action. 188
These snowstorms did more than highlight PEPCO's ill-preparedness and
the PSC's lack of preventative action. 189 For decades, Maryland's primary
utility goal focused on affordability.190 The General Assembly sought to
protect lower-income and vulnerable populations from heightened financial
hardship by keeping electricity rates as low as possible.1 91 However, the
week-plus power outages harmed these populations the most. 192 Lowerincome families may lack the financial resources to restock a refrigerator
after its contents spoi1. 193 They also may be less likely to have medical
insurance to cover illnesses caused by spoiled food. 194 Low-income and
federally-assisted persons are less likely to have the resources to relocate,

boston -and-new-york-on-the-uni ted-states-eastem-seaboardlstory-e6frf71 f1225829029847.
184 See Flaherty, supra note 178.
185 See Flaherty, supra note 178.
186 See Flaherty, supra note 178; see also Hamil R. Harris, Editorial, Prince
George's Officials Grill Pepco, WASH. POST, (Aug. 20, 2011,12:08 PM),
http://voices.washingtonpost.comllocal-breaking-news/crime-and-publicsafety/pepco-president-thomas-graham.html.
187 See Flaherty, supra note 178 (reporting that before the storms, the PSC knew
PEPCa ranked as one of the worst electric providers in the United States). The PSC
had acted after the 2009 snowstorm by opening an investigation. See Flaherty, supra
note 178. These events spurred the original creation of the ESQR, prior to the 2010
snowstorms. See Flaherty, supra note 178.
188 See Flaherty, supra note 178; see Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, discussing
the 2010 snowstorms as the catalyst for passing ESQR.
189 See Flaherty, supra note 178.
190 See infra, Part II(d) for discussion on Maryland's affordability goal.
191 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 101.
192 See Stephens, supra note 1 (detailing families keeping warm with blankets); see
Flaherty, supra note 178 (reporting medically disabled people explaining their
evacuation from powerless homes); Editorial, Why Pepco Cannot Keep the Lights
On, WASH. POST, Dec. 5,2010, available at http://www.justicefirst.org/nationaliinthe-medialwhy-pepco-cant-keep-lights-on.html.
193 See CDC.Gov: EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE,
http://www.bt.cdc.gov/disasters/poweroutage/needtoknow.asp. Even though it was
winter, some homes were warmer than the recommended refrigeration and storage
temperature for perishable foods. See id. Local health authorities urged residents to
throwaway all perishables. Id.
194 See id.
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especially when local public transportation is suspended. 195 Elderly and
disabled persons, that relied on electricity for medical needs, found
themselves stranded. 196 Furthermore, the additional costs from the storm
outages, including lost wages due to closed businesses, quickly added Up.197
PEPCO announced it would need to raise rates to pay for repairs. 198 Thus,
the storms revealed the current policy's biggest flaw: more service
interruptions result in higher overall costs for consumers, and hurt the very
·
popu1atlOns
the po 1·ICY works to protect. 199
C. An In-Depth Look at the ESQR

The Maryland General Assembly passed the Maryland Electricity Service
Quality and Reliability Act on May 10, 2011, a little over a year after
PEPCO's disastrous performance created a consumer and voter backlash?OO
While ESQR's formal introduction came before the January blizzards, the
storms certainly helped provide momentum for the bill's passage. 201
Legislators directly cited complaints against PEPCO as a motivating factor
that influenced their vote. 202 Both lawmakers and Governor O'Malley touted
ESQR as a solution that would raise reliability rates and allow the PSC to
punish utilities falling below the acceptable threshold. 203
ESQR's language targets both utilities and the PSc. 204 The statute
requires the PSC to establish an individual standard of SRQ for each utility
company.205 Interestingly, the law continues the established policy against
implementing blanket rules and standards on electric companies. 206 Despite
ESQR's lack of uniform standards, the statute requires the creation of
See Morello & Halsey, supra note 177.
See Flaherty, supra note 178.
197 See Morello & Halsey, supra note 177. The Federal Government and many area
businesses remained closed, partially due to lack of electricity. Id.
198 See Flaherty, supra note 178.
199 See generally Flaherty, supra note 178.
200 See MD. ELEC. SERVo QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ACT, supra note 14; see Bill to
Penalize Utilities if They Fall Below Standards, WBAL-TV, Feb. 4,2011, supra
195

196

note 14.
See MD. ELEC. SERvo QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ACT, supra note 14; see Bill to
Penalize Utilities if They Fall Below Standards, WBAL-TV, Feb. 4,2011, supra
note 14.
202 See MD. ELEC. SERvo QUALITY AND RELIABILITY ACT, supra note 14; see
WBAL-TV, supra note 14.
,
203 See Bill to Penalize Utilities if They Fall Below Standards, WBAL-TV, Feb. 4,
2011, supra note 14.
204 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 1.
205 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS.
§ 7-213(b),(d) (West 2011).
206 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see, e.g., In re Singer, supra note 53,
at 101 (ruling against blanket standards for all electric companies).
201
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specific qualifications for each utility's SQR. 207 The PSC must base their
systems on one of three nationally recognized SQR indexes?08 The PSC also
must set specific standards regarding a company's vegetation management,
downed wire repair, and service interruption response. 209 Individual systems
should be tailored to fit the utility's current infrastructure, customer bank,
and the utility's service area. 210 All of these systems must be in place by July
1,2012. 2II
ESQR mandates annual SQR reporting for all utilities. 212 COMAR only
required utilities to submit reports to the PSC during or after a "major storm"
event. 213 These regulations gave utilities substantial discretion under
COMAR, which resulted in companies failing to report outages after
catastrophic storms. 214 This lack of reporting delayed any PSC opinion
regarding a utility's response, as the PSC would have to order companies to
submit the required reports with all the necessary information. 215 Under
ESQR, the annual reporting requirement ensures that utilities will not be able
to conceal outage information indefinitely.216 All in all, the review mandates
provide a much-needed level of transparency to utility operations and SQR
levels.
Perhaps most significantly, ESQR calls for the PSC to automatically
review each utility's SQR performance, and a utility's failure to comply with
the ESQR may be punished via monetary penalties and sanctions. 217
Furthermore, utilities may not attempt to recoup the costs of any such
corrective action from any of their customers, a protective measure installed
See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS.
§ 7-213(e) (West 2011).
208 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS.
§ 7-213(d) (West 2011).
209 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS.
§ 7-213(e)(l)(i) (West 2011).
210 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS.
§ 7-213(e)(2) (West 2011).
211 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213(d) (West 2011).
212 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS.
§ 7-213(g) (West 2011).
213 See infra at Part J(d) for discussion on the COMAR definition of a "major storm";
see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.058 (2012); see MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.038
(2011).
214 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.038 (2011). For examples of non-compliance, see
PEPCO Snow Response Order, supra note 156; Snowstorm Report Order, supra
note 158.
215 See generally Stephens, supra note 163 (detailing the PSC rulings regarding
PEPCO's storm response, almost two years after the storms).
216 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS.
§ 7-213(g) (West 2011).
217 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS.
§ 7-213(f)(2)(ii) (West 2011). See supraat Part? for discussion relating to PSC's
lack of punitive authority under current regulations.
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to keep affordability maximized and avoid any incentives for noncompliance.218 Previously, the regulations pushed the PSC into an advisory
role.219 After major storm events, the PSC made only suggestions and
recommendations, appearing to lack the power to force change.220 By giving
the PSC stronger punitive tools, the General Assembly sent.a message to
Maryland citizens that the PSC would look out for consumers, not just
utilities.
In fact, the ESQR explicitly states in section (b): "It is the goal of this
state that each electric company provide its customers with high levels of
service quality and reliability ... ,,221 The importance of this dramatic policy
change cannot be missed. 222 Previously, the state's primary goal centered on
affordability over SQR, and the utilities successfully avoided by threatening
rate-hikes when unfavorable SQR measures arose. 223 While ESQR
specifically notes that cost-effective SQR programs are best, it makes it clear
that the one-sided argument that SQR would harm consumers is no longer
acceptable. 224 Some balancing is required, and an electric company with
sub-standard SQR ratings can be held accountable. 225
V. ANALYSIS OF THE ESQR's REAL-WORLD IMPACT ON UTILITY
STORM RESPONSES
The ESQR's design focuses on preventing Maryland consumers from
undergoing long and unnecessary power outages due to poor maintenance
and storm planning. 226 It is thus important to ask whether the ESQR would
prevent another post-Snowmaggeden scenario. Many consumers focused on
the response times between Virginia and Maryland electric companies. 227

See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2; see MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS.
§ 7-2l3(f)(2)(iii) (West 2011). Maryland's primary goal of affordability is
addressed in In re Singer, supra note 53, at 101.
219 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.07.05B (2012); see Snow Stann Report Order, supra
note 158.
220 See PEPCO Snow Response Order, supra note 157; see In re Isabel, 95 Md.
P.S.c. at 3.
221 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213(b) (West 2011).
222 See id.
223 See supra Part II (c) for discussion on Maryland's policy.
224 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note l3, at 2.
225 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2. The language also indirectly instructs
the PSC to evaluate its mission, in order to comply with the new policy. Fiscal
Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2.
226 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213(b) (West 2011).
227 See Tucker Echols, Confidence in Pepco Slumps, Dominion Gains, WASH.
BUSINESS J., (Apr. 20, 2011, 1:49 PM),
http://www.bizjoumals.com/washingtoninews/20 111.
04/19/confidence-in-pepco-slumps-dominion.html.
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This comparison calls for a brief analysis of Virginia's regulations, and
looking at how key differences required Virginia utilities' fast response time.

A. Virginia's Pro-Reliability Policy and Regulations
The 2009-10 snowstorms highlighted how Virginia's power companies
responded far better to major storm events and outages. 22 Both Dominion
Power and PEPCa suffered widespread outages, but Dominion Power had
all lights restored within two days of the second storm's end. 229 PEPCa took
over a week to restore services.230 Local media and consumers asked why
such a difference existed. 231 A comparison of each state's legal standards
reveals different policy goals playa role in answering this question.
Virginia's State Corporation Commission ("SCC") oversees the
Commonwealth's regulated energy utilities. 232 Unlike Maryland's PSC,
Virginia grants the SCC a large amount of regulatory and jUdiciary power,
including a large amount of oversight over outage response plans. 233 The
SCC's power includes requiring utilities to submit their emergency response
procedures so that the SCC may ensure proper plans exist before such an
emergency arises. 234 During an emergency, the SCC may require a utility
take certain actions.235 The Virginia Governor also can force utilities to
provide electricity to other areas during certain emergencies. 236 All of these
provisions keep a large amount of control reserved for the state, and allow
the government to step in and force action if power companies fail to respond
adequately.237
Furthermore, Virginia's policies differ from that of Maryland in that
Virginia electric companies have a statutory duty to provide reasonably
reliable service at affordable rates.238 Until the ESQR's passage, Maryland
lacked a similar policy.239 The SCC also has the power to determine that a
utility failed to fulfill this duty through consumer complaints alone, and the
See Echols, supra note 228.
See Flaherty, supra note 178; see Stephens, supra note 1.
230 See Flaherty, supra note 178; see Stephens, supra note 1.
231 See Flaherty, supra note 178; see Stephens, supra note 1.
232 See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-35 (West 2012).
233 See id.; see VA. CODE ANN. § 56-250 (West 2012); see VA. CODE ANN. § 56-249
(West 2012).
234 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-586.1 (West 2012).
235 E-mail from KennethJ. Schrad,Dir. ofInformation Resources, Va. SCC,
Response to Author's Questionnaire (Jan. 18,2012) (on file with author); VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-250 (West 2012).
236 See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-586.1 (West 2012).
237 See id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 56-250 (West 2012).
238 See generally supra at Part II, (c), for Maryland's policies favoring affordability;
see VA. CODE ANN. § 56-234.4 (West 2011); see VA. CODE ANN. § 56-234 (West
2011).
239 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. Cos. § 7-213(b)-(d) (West 2011).
228
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see can use this finding to compel operational or other changes?40 Not only
does this statute give the see the teeth to enforce the duty, but also allows
consumer complaints to show a utility has not met their dUty.241 Virginia
utilities thus have a strong incentive for high customer satisfaction rates.
In fact, Virginia's see has authority to review a power company's SRQ
ratings even before a customer complaint is filed. 242 The Virginia legislature
grants the see general oversight powers over utilities' service
performance. 243 The see may, at any time, request a utility to submit an
SRQ report to them, and investigates every consumer complaint made to the
eommission. 244 Additionally, the see reviews all utility res£onses to major
storms that cause outages for longer than twenty four hours.2 5 The Virginia
legislature thus ensured the see's oversight and control over utility SRQ
levels would not be compromised by lack of authority or administrative
power. 246
Virginia and Maryland also differ in their remedies for utility liability?47
Like Maryland, Virginia gives the see jurisdiction over power companies,
and grants them extensive remedial powers. 248 Virginia and Maryland both
allow their respective regulatory committees to act on consumer
complaints. 249 But Virginia specifically states that the see's judicial powers
do not end an aggrieved consumer's common law rights. 25o Nor maya
utility's tariff purport to do so, although they can limit liability.251 This
means a Virginia power customer is specifically not foreclosed from seeking
judicial relief, and can pursue damage claims through this avenue.252
Virginia's regulatory system certainly provides strong incentives for
utilities to minimize outages, through its remedy statutes and arming the
see with expansive powers.253 These incentives, though rarely used, may
See Schrad, supra note 236; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-6, 234.
See Schrad, supra note 236; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-6, 234.
242 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-249 (West 2011).
243 See Schrad, supra note 236; VA. CODE ANN. §56-234.4 (West 2012).
244 See Schrad, supra note 236; VA. CODE ANN. §56-234.4 (West 2012).
245 See Schrad, supra note 236.
246 See VA. CODE ANN. § 56-234.4 (West 2012).
247 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 105; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-6,253 (West
2011).
248 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS., §§ 2-112, 113 (West 2011); see VA. CODE
ANN. § 56-6 (West 2012).
249 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS., § 3-102 (West 2011); see VA. CODE ANN.
§ 56-6 (West 2012).
250 VA. CODE ANN. § 56-7 (West 2011).
251 Schrad, supra note 236; VA. CODE ANN. § 56-253 (West 2012).
252 Schrad, supra note 236. While no Virginia case law showed such an action,
perhaps these statutory provisions are Virginia's electric companies seem far more
concerned with maintaining high SRQ rates.
253 See Schrad, supra note 236; VA. CODE ANN., § 56-234.4 (West 2012); VA. CODE
ANN., § 56-6,234 (West 2012).
240
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explain why Virginia's power companies quickly restored power after the
2011 blizzards. 254 Virginia's approach highlights how strong SRQ policy
initiatives ensure utilities undertake the necessary programs to prevent
outages in the first place. 255
B. Comparing ESQR to Virginia's Regulations
ESQR revolutionizes Maryland energy policy by promoting high SRQ
satisfaction rates, much like Virginia's long-standing policies. 256 Virginia's
strong golicy initiatives likely play a major role in incentivizing utility
action. 27 Maryland adopted similarly forceful policy language in ESQR,
focusing the entire statute on creating SRQ goals for Maryland electric
utilities. 258 This historical change uses mechanisms comparable to Virginia
in determining SRQ standards, including the delineation of explicit
enforcement powers to the PSC. 259
However, ESQR does not state whether the PSC can request major storm
outage reports before initiating a hearing, as the SCC does?60 Historically,
most utilities would not submit such reports until the PSC requested one
during a Commission investigation. 261 ESQR should have strengthened the
reporting requirements allowing the PSC to adopt the SCC' s method of
automatic review. 262
ESQR also lacks statutory guarantees of legal action for Maryland
consumers. 263 Virginia customers have multiple routes for taking legal
See Schrad, supra note 236. Mr. Schrad noted the SCC never used the
emergency powers granted by VA. CODE ANN., § 56-250 (West 2012).
255 See generally Rudy, supra note 17, at 1415.
256 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 1; see VA. CODE ANN., § 56-6, 234
(West 2012).
257 See text accompanying note 250, supra.
258 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 3-4; compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB.
UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011), and VA. CODE ANN., § 56-234.4 (West 2011).
259 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 2 (requiring use of national ranking
systems and models, including SAIDI and SAIFI, for setting ESQR's standards); see
also Schrad, supra note 236 (stating the SCC uses SAID! and SAIFI scores for
determining SRQ goals).
260 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13; compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS.
§ 7-213 (West 2011), with VA. CODE ANN., § 56-249 (West 2012).
261 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 4-5; see PEPCO Snow Response Order,
supra note 156 (where the PSC orders such a report after opening an investigation).
PEPCa's outages certainly reached the level needed to trigger the major storm
reporting requirement in MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.0 1.03B (2011), but PSC records
show this regulation is not followed by utilities.
262 Compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011), with VA. CODE
ANN., § 56-249 (West 2012).
263 Compare MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011), with VA. CODE
ANN., § 56-253 (West 2012) (forbidding Virginia utilities from attempting to limit
consumer common law actions).
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action, although it is unclear whether Virginians utilize the judicial course?64
While Virginia's remedy laws may not be practicable, they have some
deterrent effect by creating another incentive for utilities to keep customers
happy.265
Finally, Virginia grants the SCC extensive emergency powers, while
ESQR did not extend such authority to the PSC. 266 Much like Virginia's
remedy laws, these emergency powers may be more pretense than
practice?67 But, giving such expansive authority could encourage the PSC to
adopt a more aggressive approach in utility regulation. 268 ESQR's policy
provisions underline the General Assembly's intended shift in focus to
protecting consumers, and hold the PSC to this view. 269 Given the PSC's
history, a clear delegation of emergency powers may encourage such
I
b h . 270
.
Ch anges m regu atory e aVlOr.
C. Storm Response and Utility Preparation Requirements Under

ESQR
ESQR will likely help raise SRQ ratings for Maryland utilities, and
represents a clear shift in longstanding energy policy.271 This change, while
long overdue, should help create greater customer satisfaction and relations
with utilities. 272
However, ESQR fails to resolve known problems. COMAR's vague
storm outage reporting requirements still stand, seemingly unchanged by
ESQR. 273 Moreover, ESQR does not establish automatic punishments for
utilities that fail to adequately respond to storm-related outages. 274 While
automatic punishments do not allow for case-by-case determinations, they

See VA. CODE ANN., § 56-6 (West 2012); see also Schrad, supra note 236.
See Schrad, supra note 236. Mr. Schrad noted that many of Virginia's pro-SRQ
enforcement provisions had not been utilized. Id.
266 See VA. CODE ANN., §§ 56-250, 586.1 (West 2012); see MD. CODE ANN., PUB.
UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011).
267 Schrad, supra note 236. The SCC noted these emergency powers, established in
response to the 1970's energy crisis, have never been used. !d.
268 See, e.g., Rudy, supra note 17, at 1413-15.
269 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011); see also Fiscal Policy
Note, supra note 13, at 1-2.
270 See, e.g., infra Part V(c) (reflecting the previous PSC policy favoring utility
interests) .
271 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13.
272 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13.
273 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.03B (2011). See supra Part III (c) for a discussion
on the COMAR reporting requirement.
274 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011); see also Fiscal Policy
Note, supra note 13.
264
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create strong incentives for proper pre-storm preparations. 275 ESQR also
fails to address the problem of slow and prolonged PSC reviews after major
storms caused outages. 276 These tools would greatly hasten utility response,
raise SRQ levels, and restore consumer faith in the PSC.
The biggest variable in ESQR's future effectiveness does not stem from
the Maryland General Assembly, but from the PSc. ESQR leaves a large
amount of discretion to the PSC, which may undermine ESQR's effect on
changing utility wactices if the PSC continues its highly protective stance
towards utilities. 77 Historically, the PSC failed to stringently enforce storm
preparation regulations, choosing instead to protect utilities from outside
scrutiny.278 If ESQR is meant to prevent a repeat of the February 2010
blackouts, the PSC must change their approach and become proactive in their
enforcement of ESQR. 279 This includes a possible reconsideration by the
PSC of their 1991 Singer ruling. 28o
This concern may be unwarranted, as the PSC has already begun an
administrative review of its rules and procedures relating to utility outages.281
In December of 2011, the Commission issued an unprecedented $1,000,000
fine against PEPCO for its failures in 2010, and continued to publicly
criticize PEPCO's reliability ratings in 2012. 282 These actions hint that the
PSC itself is evolving.283 Regardless, the PSC must ensure that untimely
delays in reviewing storm reports and responding to consumer complaints
are minimized. 284 This includes clarifying regulations by adding strict
enforcement mechanisms, and building certain mandatory reliability
programs into the forthcoming individualized utility standards. 285 While the
$1,000,000 fine against PEPCO reflects the PSC's recognition of consumer
outrage, the fine still came approximately two years after the blizzards. 286 If
utility companies know complaints will be swiftly reviewed by the PSC, they
For an example of the rate-hike argument, see In re Singer, supra note 53.
See PEPCO Snow Response Order, supra note 156; Snow Storm Report Order,
surra note 158.
27 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. UTIL. COS. § 7-213 (West 2011); see supra Part III(b)
discussing previous PSC opinions and policies.
278 See In re Singer, supra note 53, at 101.
279 See generally id. at 101-05.
280 Compare Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, with In re Singer, supra note 53.
281 See Fiscal Policy Note, supra note 13, at 6.
282 Stephens, supra note 159; see Victor Zapana and Aaron C. Davis, Pepco Receives
Small Rate Hike in Maryland, WASH. POST, July 20, 2012,
http://articles.washingtonpost.coml20 12-07-20/1ocal/35486123 _l-'pepco-derechostorm-small-rate-hike.
283 See Stephens, supra note 159; but cf In re Singer, supra note 53, at 105.
284 See MD. CODE REGS. 20.50.01.03B (2011); see supra Part III (c) for a discussion
on the COMAR reporting requirement.
285 For example, requiring tree-trimming programs and targeted upgrades as part of a
utility's ESQR goals would help ensure the legislative and policy goals behind
ESQR are quickly met.
286 See Zapana and Davis, supra note 284.
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are more likely to be adequately prepared for stonns and outages. 287
Therefore, the PSC should adopt a rigid review process, including fines for
failing to appropriately respond to a PSC investigation.
VI. CONCLUSION

Two blizzards and days of freezing homes, tired families and consumer
outrage lay the ground for ESQR's passage. 288 The Act will help prevent
another prolonged outage like the one PEPCO customers experienced in
2010. 289 Maryland utilities are now required to institute programs that will
help prevent many future outages?90 More importantly, ESQR shows the
General Assembly will act to hold utilities liable for massive post-stonn
outages?91
See supra Part II(c).
See supra Part IV(c) for discussion ofESQR's passage.
289 See supra Part IV(b) for discussion of the 2010 blizzards.
290 PEPCO and BG&E instituted reliability improvement programs before ESQR's
effective date ofJanuary 1,2013. PEPCO, Press Release, Maryland State
Legislators Progress Report (Dec. 2012) available at
http://www.pepco.coml_res/documentsIPEPCO%20MD%20REP%20PROGRESS%
20RPT%20DEC2012.pdf; BGE, Tree & Vegetation Management,
http://www.bge.comlcustomerservice/servicerequests/treetrimming/pages/default.asp
x (last visited Feb. 8,2013). In October 2012, PEPCO's preparations and
performance were lauded as a significant improvement after Hurricane Sandy dealt
the D.C. area a glancing blow. J. Freedom du Lac, Annys Shin and Steve Hendrix,
Inside Pepco: How the Utility Kept the Lights on During Hurricane Sandy, WASH.
POST. Oct. 30, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.coml20 12-1 030/loca1/35499547_1-IJepco-holdings-hurricane-sandy-utility. PEPCO suffered
approximately 42,000 outages, compared to Dominion Power's 81,000. Id. BG&E
also reported a drop in service interruptions after Hurricane Sandy. Andrea K.
Walker and Jamie Smith Hopkins, BGE Works to Restore Power to Thousands of
Residents, BALT. SUN, Oct. 31,2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.coml2012-1O31lbusinesslbs-bz-sandy-power-outages-20 121 030_1_bge-works-power-linespower-for-eight-days (BGE reported approximately 338,000 outages, a drop from
over 750,000 outages during Hurricane Irene).
291 PEPCO faced its first real challenge under the new ESQR requirements after a
line of severe storms (known as a "derecho") hit the Washington D. C. metropolitan
area on June 29, 2012. See Aaron C. Davis and Mary Pat Flaherty, Pepco Defends
Its Response to Derecho Storm, Saying it 'Mobilized Quickly', WASH. POST, July 30,
2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/20 12-07 -30/10ca1/35487619_1-IJepcoderecho-storm-outages. The derecho caused more than 440,000 PEPCO customers
to lose electricity, with more than 229,403 customers experiencing an outage for
more than seventy two hours. Huffington Post D.C., Pepco Power Restoration
Efforts Under Fire from Customers, Politicians (Updated), The HUFFINGTON POST
(last updated July 2, 2012, 11 :26 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.coml2012/07/02/dc-power-outages_n_1643652.htmI.It
took a full week for PEPCO to restore power to all of its customers, and many
287
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There are many differences between ESQR and Virginia's utility
regulations. Maryland may not need to match Virginia's level of consumer
protection, but ESQR allows Maryland to adopt similar provisions if
necessary. ESQR makes one point clear: both Maryland and Virginia
recognize that states and utilities must work together in order to keep the
lights on.

elected officials publicly criticized the slow response time. See id.; see Davis and
Flaherty, Pepco Defends Its Response to Derecho Storm, Saying it 'Mobilized
Quickly,' WASH. POST, July 30, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.comJ2012-0730/10cal/3 5487619_1-IJepco-derecho-storm-outages. BG&E also received heavy
criticism for its derecho response, and the PSC held a hearing on BG&E's reliability
improvement plan in September of2012. See BALT. SUN, Editorial, Our View: the
Light Goes On at BGE, Sept. 17,2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.comJ2012-0917/news/bs-ed-bge-20 120917_1_derecho-storm-power-lines-underground-outages.
BG&E reported over 750,000 outages after the derecho. Walker and Hopkins, supra
note 292.

